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We analyze how China’s emergence as a destination for foreign direct investment is affecting the
ability  of  other  countries  to  attract  FDI.  We  do  so  using  an  approach  that  accounts  for  the
endogeneity of China’s FDI. The impact turns out to vary by region. China’s rapid growth and
attractions as a destination for FDI also encourages FDI flows to other Asian countries, as if
producers in these economies belong to a common supply chain. There is also evidence of FDI
diversion from OECD recipients. We interpret this in terms of FDI motivated by the desire to
produce close to the market where the final sale takes place. For whatever reason  ￿ limits on their
ability to raise finance for investment in multiple markets or limits on their ability to control
operations in diverse locations  ￿ firms more inclined to invest in China for this reason are
corresponding less inclined to invest in the OECD. A detailed analysis of Japanese foreign direct
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1.  Introduction 
  China’s emergence has been perhaps the single most important new development 
affecting the world economy at the outset of the 21
st century.  By some estimates the 
country contributed more than a quarter of the growth of global GDP in recent years.
2  It 
is the world’s sixth larger trader, supplying more than 6 per cent of global exports.  It is a 
leading destination for foreign direct investment by producers seeking to capitalize on its 
large domestic market and low labor costs.  (See Figure 1.)  It has become sufficiently 
consequential that, for a period in the autumn of 1994, the question of whether the 
Chinese economy was overheating was the number one issue for forecasters of global 
growth.   
Much of this attention has focused on how China is affecting the advanced 
economies. There has been discussion for example of whether a revaluation of the 
renminbi would lead to a general revaluation of Asian currencies against the dollar and 
narrow the U.S. trade deficit.  There are complaints in Europe that China’s reluctance to 
let its currency to rise has caused the dollar’s decline to be disproportionately 
concentrated on the euro-dollar rate.
3  There are worries in Japan and Korea that the rapid 
                                                 
1 University of California, Berkeley and Bank of England, respectively.  None of the views expressed here 
are necessarily those of the Bank of England. We thank Julian di Giovanni and seminar participants at the 
Bank of England for helpful comments. 
2 When GDP is measured at purchasing power parity. 
3 See for example the report in Agence France Presse (2004).   2 
growth of Chinese industry, fed by foreign direct investment from these and other 
countries, is “hollowing out” their manufacturing sectors.
4   
But China’s impact on developing countries is equally profound.  As an exporter 
of labor-intensive manufactures, China competes with other developing countries with a 
comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufactured goods.  In the developing world 
there is trepidation that, with 200 million to 300 million underemployed rural Chinese 
still to be integrated into the modern manufacturing sector, the impact has only begun to 
be felt.
5  As a magnet for foreign investment, China has allegedly made it more difficult 
for other emerging markets to attract FDI.  Thus, when FDI inflows into the Mexican 
maquiladora sector dropped from $3 billion in 2000 to $2 billion in 2003, there was a 
tendency to blame the emergence of China as a more attractive low-cost production and 
export platform.
6  When foreign direct investment in Malaysia fell from RM 19 billion in 
2001 to RM 2 billion in the first half of 2002, Prime Minister Mahathir explained that 
“Everyone is feeling the pinch because the amount of FDIs [sic] has shrunk and then, a 
lot of that is going to China…”
7   
But China is also a growing market for the exports of other countries.  It is 
currently the fastest growing foreign market for countries like Brazil that are major 
exporters of raw materials.
8  Chinese companies are integrated into global supply chains, 
assembling components produced in other parts of the world and producing components 
                                                 
4 Lincoln (2002) provides discussion and analysis. 
5 At the end of 2004 these fears were highlighted by the impending expiration of the Multifiber 
Arrangement, by which the growth of China’s textile and apparel exports had been constrained.  There is 
also the urban legend that more sombreros are now manufactured in China than in Mexico.  
6 Thus, United Nations (2004, p.61) concludes that “the relocation of FDI from the maquila industries had 
mainly been caused by competition from Asia.  One third of all enterprises that have left are reported to 
have moved to China…” 
7 Straits Times (21 September 2002), quoted in McKibbin and Woo (2003), p.14. 
8 See for example the report in Lapper (2004).   3 
and materials that are assembled and finished in other countries.  Thus, the growth of 
capacity and demand in China, rather than making other developing countries less 
attractive as platforms for production, could make them more attractive to the extent that 
they succeed in producing for the Chinese market and integrating into the same supply 
chains. 
The point applies also to FDI.  To reap the full benefits of building assembly 
plants in China, firms may also need to invest in component production in Singapore or 
Malaysia.  The increase of FDI in China may thus encourage additional FDI in other 
countries rather than crowding it out.  
To date, analysis of these issues has focused mainly on export competition and 
Asia.  Yang and Vines (2000) simulate a multi-sector, multi-country model with 
differentiated products as a way of analyzing the impact of China on exports from other 
Asian countries, finding that ASEAN’s exports drop slightly while those of Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong rise.  Ahearne, Fernald, Loungani and 
Schindler (2003) regress the growth of other Asian countries’ exports on China’s exports 
(and various controls) but find only a weak correlation.  Our own take (Eichengreen, 
Rhee and Tong 2004) uses the gravity model augmented to include a role for China’s 
exports.  While we find a tendency for China’s exports to third markets to crowd out the 
exports of other Asian countries, this effect is felt mainly in markets for consumer goods 
and hence by less-developed Asian countries that export those products, not in markets 
for capital goods or by the more advanced Asian economies for which machinery and 
equipment comprise a significant fraction of total exports.  At the same time, there has 
been a tendency for a rapidly growing China to suck up imports from its Asian neighbors.    4 
But this direct effect of Chinese imports is mainly felt in markets for capital goods and 
thus by the more advanced Asian economies.  This analysis of trade flows thus suggests 
that more and less developed countries are being affected differently by China’s rise. 
Even fewer studies have considered how China’s emergence as a magnet for FDI 
is affecting FDI flows to other countries.  Mercereau (2005) uses data for 14 countries 
spanning the period 1984-2002.  He includes China’s share of total FDI to the region as a 
way of capturing potential crowding out of FDI flows to other countries and finds that 
crowding out, so measured, is evident only for two countries: Singapore and Myanmar. 
However, these regressions are estimated by panel OLS and suffer from obvious 
endogeneity problems. Chantasasawat, Fung, Iizaka and Siu (2004) use data for eight 
Asian economies in addition to China over the period 1985-2001 and estimate equations 
for China’s FDI inflows and other Asian countries’ FDI inflows by two-stage least 
squares.  The annual data for the other eight countries are pooled and treated as a panel.  
They find that China’s FDI receipts and other Asian countries’ receipts are positively, not 
negatively, correlated.  This is a striking finding, although questions can be raised about 
their approach.
9 One also wonders whether their conclusion carries over to other 
regions.
10 
                                                 
9Their strategy of using China-specific variables as instruments for FDI inflows into other countries would 
not work if they included time fixed effects (which are necessarily omitted), since the year effects and 
China-specific variables would then be perfectly correlated.   
10 In addition, McKibbin and Woo (2003) calibrate a simulation model on this assumption for the period 
subsequent to China’s accession to the WTO and show that the ASEAN-4 countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines and Thailand) have a tendency to lose income and productivity growth, ceteris paribus.  In 
fact, McKibban and Woo distinguish two cases, which they associate with the pre-2002 (pre-WTO) and 
post-2002 (post-WTO) periods. They assume that FDI flows into China and into other Asian countries were 
complementary prior to China’s accession to the WTO (that increases in FDI in China led to increases in 
FDI in other Asian countries) but that FDI flows into China and FDI flows into other Asian countries were 
substitutes thereafter.  Their simulation analysis focuses on the latter (FDI diversion) case.  Other Asian 
countries lose productivity growth because in their analysis FDI is a source of positive technology 
spillovers (as well as a way of raising capital/labor ratios).  The authors also go on to show how the 
countries in question can limit the loss of FDI inflows and neutralize the impact of any loss that they fail to   5 
In this paper we seek to shed further light on these issues.  We focus on the 
following questions.  Has China’s emergence as a low-cost production and export 
platform and its growing attractions as a destination for FDI made it more difficult for 
other countries to attract FDI?  Which countries and regions have seen FDI inflows 
diverted toward China, and which source countries are responsible for the shift?  Or does 
China’s FDI-fueled growth, by making neighboring countries a logical platform for 
producing for the Chinese market and stimulating the development of regional supply 
chains, in fact heighten their attractions as destinations for FDI?   
The framework for our analysis is the gravity model of bilateral flows but used 
here to analyze foreign direct investment rather than trade.  In addition to the standard 
gravity-model variables – inter alia, the size of the source and destination countries and 
the distance between them – we augment the specification to include also Chinese FDI 
receipts from the same source country.  The identification strategy – using the distance 
between China and the source country as an instrument for Chinese FDI receipts – is also 
the same as in that previous study.  And, as in our previous analysis of exports, our 




                                                                                                                                                 
offset by strengthening their ability to absorb new foreign technologies and engaging in indigenous 
technical innovations.  Blazquez-Lidoy, Rodriguez and Santiso (2004, p.30) observe that FDI into Mexico 
declined by 30 per cent between 2002 and 2003, FDI into Brazil by 52 per cent, while FDI flows into China 
were soaring – a fact they attribute to “the prospect of a huge domestic market of 1.3 billion consumers…”  
They worry that this will slow technology transfer and industrialization, as Latin America reverts to being 
an exporter of primary commodities.  But they do not first test for FDI diversion.  There is also an 
interesting related study by Blonigen, Davies, Waddell and Naughton (2004) that uses spatial econometric 
techniques to analyze the spatial correlation of FDI to alternative (neighboring regions).  However, their 
data is limited to OECD countries, and their method could not be used to answer our question without 
further adaptation.   6 
2.  Foreign Direct Investment since 1990 
Since the early 1990s, China has become a major destination for foreign direct 
investment.  The country now has the third largest stock of FDI, after only the United 
States and United Kingdom.
11  This increase has occurred in the context of the global 
growth of FDI.  Net FDI flows to developing countries rose steadily over the 1990s, from 
$21 billion in 1989 to $179 billion in 1999.
12  The bulk of these flows went to a handful 
of countries, notably China, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico.  The economies of Central 
and Eastern Europe also attracted growing amounts of FDI over the course of the decade 
but starting from low levels, reflecting the early difficulties of transition.
13 
In fact FDI in developing countries accounted for only a minority of the world 
total.  In the second half of the 1990s some 68 per cent of global FDI inflows were 
received by the advanced economies, a share that rose to 79 per cent in 1999-2000.  This 
surge in the share of global FDI attracted by the advanced countries reflected both the 
effects of crises in emerging markets at the end of the 1990s and the privatization of 
telecommunications providers in many advanced countries.  In interpreting our empirical 
results below, it will be import to place the growth of China’s FDI receipts in this global 
context. 
The main sources of FDI remain Europe, the U.S., and Japan.  Europe was the 
source of nearly 60 per cent of global FDI inflows in the 1990s.  Much of this was intra-
European FDI, reflecting the incentives for consolidation provided by the creation of the 
                                                 
11 See Adhikari and Yang (2002).  Above all of these countries is Luxembourg, which is a special case, in 
that most of its FDI is transshipped to other destinations. 
12 These estimates are from World Bank (2002). 
13 Over the course of the decade FDI in the transition economies reached 3 per cent of the world total, 
surpassing the share of developing Asia excluding China.  Two thirds of total inflows to the transition 
economies were concentrated in four countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia.   7 
single market.  In addition, toward the end of the decade the advent of the euro, by 
enhancing the liquidity of European financial markets and providing more finance for 
mergers and acquisitions, encouraged European FDI flows to other parts of the world.  
U.S. FDI also increased in the second half of the 1990s, reflecting the liquidity of U.S. 
financial markets and impact of globalization.  After surging at the end of the 1980s in 
response to the appreciation of the yen, Japanese FDI declined in the 1990s as the 
economy entered its slump.  More recently, South-South FDI flows have grown in 
importance.  Asia’s newly developing countries have engaged in growing FDI in China.  
China and South Africa are now major investors in Africa.  There is also much talk of 
Chinese FDI in Latin America. 
FDI in China picked up after 1993, reflecting the further liberalization of the 
economy, exchange rate unification, and inflation stabilization.  Although the country 
first opened its doors to FDI in 1979, interest on the part of foreign investors was 
stimulated when Deng Xiaoping reaffirmed China’s commitment to market-friendly 
reforms and opening the economy during a tour of the southern provinces in 1992.  
Inflows first exceeded $30 billion in 1993 and ranged from $35 billion to $45 billion 
from 1994 through 2000, reaching $47 billion in 2001.  Increasingly these inflows have 
taken the form not of greenfield investment but mergers and acquisitions, the number of 
which rose 107 in 2002 to 214 in 2003.
14 
The FDI receipts of other Asian countries held up well through 1996, and their 
subsequent slump was presumably a consequence of the financial crisis of 1997-8.
15  But 
                                                 
14 United Nations (2004), p.50.  Capital Markets Consultative Group (2004) argues that the share of M&As 
in China’s FDI inflows should increase further as the privatization of state enterprises gains momentum. 
15 Policy makers in some Asian countries then responded to the crisis by liberalizing access to their markets 
for foreign investors, and the depreciation of East Asia exchange rates encouraged fire-sale FDI.  For   8 
flows of FDI to developing countries then declined by 26 per cent between 1999 and 
2003, while those to China rose sharply.
16  It was not possible to attribute these disturbing 
trends to the passing effects of the 1997-8 crisis.  They thus created worries that China 
was siphoning off FDI to countries in East Asia and Latin America that had previously 
been among the dominant developing-country destinations for foreign investment.
17  
Although FDI in developing countries picked up in 2003, it did so unevenly.  Thus, while 
flows to developing countries in Africa and Asia rose, they continued falling in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, perhaps reflecting “the relocation of production from some 
Latin American countries to lower-cost locations such as China” (United Nations 2004, 
p.39).
18   
The main sources of China’s FDI have been Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and 
Japan.  Together these four countries have accounted for more than 50 per cent of 
China’s FDI receipts in the typical year.  Japan is often pointed to as an economy that 
may be redirecting its foreign direct investment from other potential destinations and 
toward China.  Thus, news reports note the intention of Japanese firms to downsize their 
operations in Singapore and ASEAN while relocating to China in response to both lower 
                                                                                                                                                 
example, cross-border M&A purchases in Korea rose from virtually zero prior to the crisis to an annual 
average of $6 billion in 1998-2000.  Wong and Adams (2002), p.9. 
16 Palmade and Anayiotas (2004), p.1. 
17 Thus, IMF (2004, p.87) warns that “higher FDI flows to China may reduce FDI to other developing 
countries…” although it provides no evidence to this effect. 
18 Some observers argue that China and certain other Asian countries compete for FDI only to a limited 
extent, since their governments pursue different development strategies.  For example, while China favors 
export-oriented FDI, India has only encouraged FDI in higher-technology activities, preferring to protect 
other domestic producers from competition by foreign-investment enterprises.  In this view, the decline in 
FDI receipts elsewhere in Asia reflected other factors, such as continuing political instability in Indonesia 
and the global recession starting in 2001.  It can be similarly argued that FDI in Latin America was 
artificially boosted by the one-time privatization of infrastructure, financial institutions and petroleum 
producers in the 1990s.  The subsequent decline in FDI inflows reflected the passing of this one-time event, 
in this view, rather than the declining relative attractiveness of Latin America as a destination for foreign 
multinationals.   9 
costs of production and the attractions of a large domestic market.
19 IMF (2002) refers to 
the tendency for Japanese companies to move their electronic component production 
facilities from Singapore and Malaysia to China. 
In sum, “[the] central issue,” in the words of Wong and Adams (2002), “is 
whether China is absorbing a predominantly large share of FDI and crowding out FDI to 
the rest of Asia.”  The same question can also be asked of FDI flows to other parts of the 
world.  But, as these same authors caution, “viewed from a longer term perspective, FDI 
inflows to China and to the other part of Asia could well be complementary rather than 
competitive.”  This is the issue we address in the remainder of this paper. 
 
3.  Data and Methodology 
The data for our study are drawn mainly from the OECD.
20  The OECD defines 
FDI as international investment by a resident entity in one country (the direct investor) 
with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in a country 
other than that of the investor (the direct investment enterprise).
21  It provides data for 
FDI flows, disaggregated by destination, for 29 source countries (the principal European 
countries, the U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, South Korea and Turkey).  
It breaks down outflows from these countries, by destination, distinguishing 60 OECD 
and non-OECD recipients.  To broaden our coverage of FDI flows in Asia, where the 
largest impact may be felt, we added data on FDI inflows from national sources for 
                                                 
19 See the citations in Wong and Adams (2002), p.13.   
20 “Source OECD” at http://www.sourceoecd.org. 
21 As described in the glossary to Source OECD, “Lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term 
relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant degree of influence by the 
direct investor on the management of the direct investment enterprise.  Direct investment involves both the 
initial transaction between the two entities and all subsequent capital transactions between them and among 
affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated.”   10 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Vietnam (information on which is not included in the OECD 
data base).  We focus on the period starting in 1988, since China only became an 
important destination for FDI from the early 1990s. 
The OECD provides FDI in source-country currency.  We convert it into millions 
of U.S. dollars and then deflate it by the U.S. CPI for urban consumers.  Real GDP and 
GDP per capita in constant 1995 U.S. dollars are obtained from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. Other country-specific variables, such as land area and 
language, are from Rose (2002), as is the distance variable.  See Appendix 1 for further 
details. 
  The framework for our analysis is the familiar workhorse of the empirical 
international economics, the gravity model, where the log of FDI is related to on 
measures of the economic size of the source and destination countries and the distance 
between them.  We consider bilateral flows between all 29 source and 63 destination 
countries.
22  We regress the log of FDI by country i in country j (say, of Japan in Mexico) 
on their log GDPs, their log per capita GDPs, the distance between them, and the other 
now-standard gravity model arguments (combined land area, land lockedness, number of 
islands, common language, common colonizer, whether the countries in question were 
ever in a colonial relationship).  Our innovation is to include a measure of China’s FDI 
receipts from the same source country (in the present example, Japan).  We model 
                                                 
22 With provision for observations dropped due to missing variables. When the data point is not missing but 
zero FDI is recorded between a pair of countries (as is the case with about 15 per cent of our non-missing 
observations), it is not clear how to treat this observation, especially since the log of zero is undefined.  
Conventional practice in the gravity model literature is to replace the zero observations with the minimum 
of the log of positive values in the sample (in the present case, -7).  We proceed in this manner here.  
Alternatively, one could simply drop these observations, but this might be a source of truncation bias. In 
practice, we find very similar results when dropping the zero observations and setting them to -7. Similarly, 
studies like Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) that have used Tobit and similar methods to adjust for the 
possibility of truncation in the context of trade tend to find that the impact on the estimated coefficients is 
minimal.     11 
separately China’s own FDI receipts and the FDI receipts of other countries using this 
same framework. 
  The benchmark specification does not include country-pair fixed effects, which 
authors like Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) suggest may be important, since we are 
already including a country-pair specific variable, namely distance.
23  Below we follow 
Anderson and Marcouiller’s suggestion for how to deal with this problem, namely by 
adding country-pair specific institutional variables such as measures of country risk.  We 
use indices from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which provides measures 
of political, economic and financial risk.  Here we focus on its measure of political risk, 
which seeks to capture bureaucratic quality, corruption, democratic accountability, ethnic 
tensions, external conflict, governmental stability, internal conflict, investment profile, 
law and order, military in politics, religious tension, and socioeconomic conditions.
24  We 
include the ICRG measure for both the source and destination country. 
  While the gravity model has been widely used in studies of trade, its application 
to bilateral FDI flows is less common.  However, a number of earlier studies have shown 
that the gravity model also has explanatory power when applied to foreign direct 
investment.  This is not surprising: larger countries have more companies with the 
resources to invest abroad and are more likely to attract FDI; similarly, to the extent that 
distance proxies for information as well as transportation costs, countries located at a 
greater distance are less likely to engage in bilateral FDI.  An early study by Grubert and 
                                                 
23 Adding country-pair fixed effects would also require us to drop common language, land lockedness, 
number of islands, common land border, and common colonizer.  Below we show what happens when we 
replace these variables with country-pair fixed effects. 
24 The index runs from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating lower risk.  It tends to vary significantly over 
time for emerging markets but less for advanced countries.  As for China itself, between 1990 and 2002, the 
period covered here, the index varies from 56 to 75.   12 
Mutti (1991) used the gravity model to analyze patterns of plant and equipment 
investment by U.S. multinationals.  Frankel (1997) used the gravity model to analyze the 
impact of preferential trade arrangements on FDI.  Hejazi and Safarian (2002) used an 
augmented gravity model to explain Canadian FDI.  Stein and Duade (2001) used the 
gravity model to analyze FDI flows between 28 OECD home countries and 63 host 
countries, focusing on how institutional characteristics of the destination countries in 
particular affect the volume of flows.  Loungani, Mody, Razin and Sadka (2003) 
employed a gravity model of bilateral FDI to analyze the role of information in directing 
investment flows.  di Giovanni (2005) used the gravity model to analyze cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions. 
  It is important to recognize the potential endogeneity of Chinese FDI in an 
equation designed to explain FDI flows between other country pairs.  Unobserved factors 
(for example, an improvement in investor sentiment worldwide) that increase Japanese 
FDI in Mexico will also in general increase Japanese FDI in China, creating a correlation 
between the error term and the key explanatory variable.  The standard treatment for this 
problem is instrumental variables, the difficulty being the paucity of plausible and 
powerful instruments that is the bane of empirical macroeconomics.   
Fortunately, in the present context the gravity model suggests an instrument that 
is both exogenous and strongly correlated with Chinese FDI.  The obvious instrument, in 
other words, is the distance between China and the country that is the source of the 
foreign investment.
25   
                                                 
25 In addition, the gravity model suggests including China’s GDP as an instrument in the first-stage 
regression.  Although this variable, like distance, is correlated with China’s FDI, questions can be raised 
about its endogeneity.  But the dependent variable in the first-stage regression is China’s FDI receipts from 
a particular source country, Japan for example, not its aggregate FDI receipts.  While there are plausible   13 
A problem is that this instrumental variable does not vary over time.  This would 
mean that we are using the cross section variation in our instrument to identify the 
exogenous component of Chinese FDI but using the result to address a time-series 
question (how changes over time in China’s FDI receipts are affecting other countries’ 
FDI inflows).  We therefore build on the increasingly large literature on FDI and 
institutional quality (Hines, Henisz 2000, Wei 2000, Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias 
2000) by also including the ICRG index of political risk in China as an additional time-
varying instrumental variable for Chinese FDI. 
Table 1 shows the first-stage estimates based on this specification.  Columns 1 
and 2 are for the case where the only instrumental variable is China’s distance from the 
country that is the source of its FDI. Columns 3 and 4 add China’s GDP as a time-varying 
instrument. Columns 5 and 6 then add the measure of China’s political risk.  In columns 7 
and 8 we introduce time fixed effects in both the first and second stages to avoid 
conflating common trends with causal effects. This requires us to drop China’s GDP and 
political risk from the list of instrumental variables, since both are linear functions of the 
time dummies. Reassuringly, our results for the second stage are very similar across all 
these specifications of the first stage.  In what follows we use the time dummies in our 
baseline specification.
26 
                                                                                                                                                 
reasons for thinking that China’s FDI- (and export-) led growth model involves causality running from FDI 
inflows to GDP as well as the other way around, it is less obvious that China’s aggregate GDP is affected 
by its FDI from an individual source country.  In practice, our results are essentially the same when we 
drop Chinese GDP from the instrument list, although the coefficient estimates are slightly less precise.  
This is reassuring, since when we include time fixed effects, as we do in the benchmark estimates, China’s 
GDP must be dropped from the instrument list since it is perfectly correlated with the vector of period 
dummies. 
26 When we use all three instrumental variables (distance from China, China’s GDP, and China’s political 
risk), the coefficient capturing the impact of Chinese FDI inflows on other countries’ FDI receipts enters 
with a coefficient of -0.08 with a standard error of 0.03.  Evidently, opting instead for the vector of time 
dummies leads to a smaller impact (where smaller means in absolute value terms), the analogous   14 
4.  Basic Results 
In Table 2 we report the second stage estimates.  We provide OLS estimates for 
comparison, which shows how much difference is made by the instrumental variables.   
The basic gravity variables enter as expected.  Larger countries send and receive 
more FDI.  Higher labor costs in the originating country and lower labor costs in the 
destination (as captured by per capita GDP) are associated with larger FDI flows. 
Distance between the sending and receiving countries has a negative impact, while 
common language, common land border, common colonizer, past colonial relationship, 
access to sea lanes, and the existence of a currency union all have a positive impact.  Our 
time-varying measure of institutional quality enters positively for both the sending and 
receiving countries.  This makes sense, since higher values of this variable imply lower 
risk. 
The key coefficient for present purposes is that on Chinese FDI.  In the 
instrumental-variables regressions, the coefficient on this variable is negative but not 
significantly different from zero at the 95 per cent confidence level.  (Here and 
throughout we report robust standard errors that correct for heteroscedasticity.)  When we 
exclude the time fixed effects (in estimates not reported in Table 2), the coefficient 
remains negative and becomes significantly different from zero.  Thus, there is some sign 
here of a tendency for China’s FDI inflows to crowd out FDI inflows to other countries, 
though the robustness of the effect is not clear.  Note how much difference 
                                                                                                                                                 
coefficient in Table 2 being -0.1. Note, however, that the pattern of effects on the OECD, Asia, Latin 
America and Central and Eastern Europe is the same irregardless of whether or not time dummies are 
dropped in favor of additional time-varying instrumental variables.   15 
instrumentation makes; in the OLS estimates provided only for comparison, the 
coefficient on Chinese FDI is instead strongly positive.
27   
The question is whether FDI in China has the same impact on FDI in all regions – 
that is, whether the weakly negative coefficient on Chinese FDI is in fact conflating 
different effects in different parts of the world.  In Table 3 we therefore distinguish FDI 
flows to Asia, Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and the OECD, where we 
exclude from the OECD Mexico and South Korea (since they joined the organization 
only midway through our sample period we include them instead with Latin America and 
Asia) as well as Japan (which we also include with the Asian grouping).  It appears that 
Chinese FDI inflows are is complementary with the FDI inflows of other Asian countries.  
Recall that this was also the finding of Chantasasawat, Fung, Iizaka and Siu 2004, using a 
different methodology.  We find essentially the same thing for Central and Eastern 
Europe and no impact on the FDI receipts of Latin America.
28  There is little evidence 
here, in other words, that China’s FDI creates problems for other developing economies 
by limiting their own access to FDI.   
Thus, the weak negative coefficient obtained for the full sample is driven by the 
only remaining country grouping, the OECD.  This result appears to be robust; it is not 
                                                 
27 Not surprisingly, since FDI in China and FDI in other countries tend to be affected by the same trends in 
globalization and shifts in investor sentiment.  Note that this is the same result that we found in our 
previous paper for exports: Chinese exports had a tendency to crowd out other countries’ exports when the 
distance between China and its final market was used as an instrument, but Chinese exports and other 
countries’ exports were positively correlated when ordinary least squares was used. 
28 It turns out that the positive coefficient on China’s FDI in the equations for Central and Eastern Europe 
is driven by the observations for one country, Hungary.  Deleting the observations for Hungary renders the 
coefficient on China’s FDI insignificantly different from zero; in contrast, deleting the observations for 
other Central and Eastern European countries one by one has no impact on the results.  (The other members 
of this region for which we have observations are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, the Slovak 
Republic, Romania, Russia, Slovenia and Ukraine.)  It appears that this effect is driven by the observations 
for 1993-95, when Hungary engaged in a burst of privatization transactions and China was simultaneously 
opening to foreign flows.  In other words, there may be reason to worry that this particular correlation is 
spurious.   16 
obviously driven by the observations for any one OECD economy.
29  An interpretation is 
that in some cases, notably those involving OECD countries, competition for FDI is 
driven not merely by relative costs of production but also by market-size considerations.  
Automobile producers, for example, when considering in which countries to undertake 
FDI, take into account the advantages of producing close to the final market both for 
tariff-jumping reasons and in order to be able to better tailor their product mix to local 
demand.  The interest of motor-vehicle producers to get into China in order to tap that 
country’s growing demand for their products, which has been much discussed since the 
early 1990s, is a case in point.  To be sure, for this desire to set up production facilities in 
China to discourage investment in additional plant in other markets, there must be an 
added element.  There must be limits on the ability of headquarters to efficiently control 
overseas facilities in a proliferation of different locations, for example, or increasing costs 
of external finance.  Our results suggest that one or another of these considerations has 
been operating in the present context. 
 
5.  Robustness Checks 
We performed number of sensitivity analyses of the robustness of these results.  
First, we limited the sample to the period starting in 1993 when FDI flows into China 
became increasingly important.  The results are similar to before.  When we aggregate all 
regions together, the effect of Chinese FDI is still negative but insignificantly different 
from zero.  The positive, statistically significant impact on other Asian countries is still 
                                                 
29 When we drop the different OECD countries from the sample one by one, the only case in which the 
significant negative coefficient on Chinese FDI is eliminated is the Netherlands. Even then, the coefficient 
in question is still negative (at -0.07).  And when we drop the Netherland and Germany together, the 
previous result is restored.   17 
evident and, indeed, larger than before, as if regional supply chains and other investment 
complementarities have become more pronounced with time.  The estimated coefficient 
for Asia rises from 0.74 with a standard error of 0.10 to 0.91 with a standard error of 
0.11. The main difference is that the coefficient for Latin America also turns positive, 
although it remains small (at 0.14) and is not significantly different from zero at standard 
confidence levels.  There has been much recent discussion of increased FDI in Latin 
America to provide raw materials for the FDI-fueled industrial boom in China – both by 
China itself and by third countries (see e.g. China Economic Net 2004).  It could be that 
this is what we are picking up, although the sample period may end too soon to fully 
capture a development heavily concentrated toward its end. 
           Second, we experimented with adding other potential determinants of FDI to 
verify that the Chinese FDI variable was not simply picking up their effects.  We added 
measures for the presence or absence of controls on FDI inflows and outflows for the 
receiving and sending countries, respectively.
30  The coefficients on controls have the 
expected signs: less control of outflows in the sending country and less control of inflows 
in the receiving country make for more bilateral FDI.  Importantly, the coefficients on 
China’s FDI are largely unchanged from before.
31 
  We also added a measure of bilateral exchange rate variability (defined as the 
coefficient of variation of monthly average changes in the bilateral exchange rate over the 
                                                 
30 These variables were coded from the standard IMF source by Nancy Brune, to whom we are grateful for 
sharing her data. 
31 The one difference is that the positive coefficient on Latin American FDI receipts is now larger (at 0.64) 
and significantly different from zero (with a t-statistic of 2.79).  Unfortunately, the partial coverage of our 
controls variables forces us to drop the observations for Colombia, Panama and Venezuela, leaving only 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico.  The first three countries are all cases where China’s FDI-fueled 
growth has been cited as a factor encouraging foreign investment in their primary-producing sectors.  Thus, 
it is hard to be confident that this result reflects the greater impact of Chinese growth on the attractions of 
investment in their primary producing sectors or simply the smaller sample.   18 
calendar year).  Consistent with a number of previous studies, we find that greater 
bilateral exchange rate variability does in fact significantly reduce bilateral FDI flows.  
But what is important for present purposes is that it has no impact on the previously 
estimated effects of Chinese FDI on other countries.  Similarly, we added the lagged rate 
of currency depreciation, both by itself and interacted with a dummy variable for 1999 
and 2000, in an effort to control for fire-sale FDI. The interaction term enters positively 
and significantly (at the five per cent level) in 1999, consistent with the idea of fire-sale 
FDI.  Again, however, adding these terms individually or in combination does not change 
our findings regarding the effects of China’s FDI. 
Next we added a dummy variable for whether the inflow country is a member of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the GATT (in the period prior to the 
establishment of the WTO).
32  The results support the hypothesis that WTO/GATT 
membership is associated with larger FDI inflows.
33  (The point estimate of 0.96 comes 
with a standard error of 0.17.)  Again, however, addition of this variable has no impact on 
our results for the effects of Chinese FDI. 
Finally, we examined the impact of adding country-pair fixed effects to the 
second stage. While the coefficients on Chinese FDI mostly retain their previous signs, 
many of them lose their statistical significance.  This result appears to be due to the 
multicollinearity created by adding a very large vector of country-pair dummies.  When 
we regress log GDP on the country-pair dummies, we obtain an R
2 in excess of 0.99.  
                                                 
32 From Andy Rose’s website. 
33 This is in contrast to some results on FDI in Rose (2003).  We continue to obtain the same result reported 
in the text when we drop China’s FDI from the list of explanation variables and estimate the determinants 
of inflows using country-pair fixed and random effect.  Note, however, that our sample is somewhat 
different, and, perhaps more importantly, Rose defines his observations and dependent variable differently, 
aggregating the FDI flows to and from each country pair.     19 
Including both log GDP and the country-pair dummies as explanatory variables produces 
a value for the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) in excess of 200, well above the critical 
cut-off point of 30 used in multicolinearity tests.  And when we include the log GDPs, 
country-pair dummies and fitted value of China’s FDI as explanatory variables, the VIF 
reaches 1,000.  Given the choice between including measures of country size or country-
pair fixed effects, we are inclined toward the former, since this helps us to pick up 
variation over time – which is in essence the subject of this paper. 
 
6. Further Disaggregation by Recipient and Provider 
We now look more closely at which countries are driving the results – and which 
countries are responsible for the positive effect of China’s FDI receipts on the FDI 
receipts of other Asian countries in particular.  To this end, we rerun the same 
specification for the subsample of Asian countries but allow the coefficient on the fitted 
value of China’s FDI inflows to differ for each Asian FDI recipient.  The results are in 
Table 4.  We obtain significantly positive coefficients for all Asian countries.  The largest 
coefficients are for Japan and Singapore, two important producers of capital goods and 
electronic components used in Chinese manufacturing, and for Indonesia, a heavy 
supplier of raw materials and energy to China.  Interestingly, the smallest coefficients are 
for Korea, where warnings of the “hollowing out” of domestic industry by China’s 
growth and fears of FDI diversion are pervasive, and Pakistan and Bangladesh, two Asian 
countries whose supply-chain links with China are relatively minimal.
34  
                                                 
34 These last results are also consistent with those in our previous paper, where we found weak negative 
effects of China’s growth of the exports of Pakistan and Bangladesh, which compete with China in the 
production of textiles, apparel, footwear, etc.  We return to this point below.   20 
Table 5 provides evidence on which FDI providers are mainly responsible for the 
positive coefficients on China’s FDI for other Asian FDI recipients.  We obtain positive 
effects across the board, suggesting that firms in all OECD countries regard FDI in China 
and FDI in other Asian countries as complements rather than substitutes.  The largest 
absolute impact is due to Japan, because the value of Japanese FDI in China (and other 
Asian countries) is far larger than FDI in Asia by other OECD source countries. 
 
7.  A Closer Look at Japanese FDI 
The preceding results suggest that China’s emergence may be particularly 
important for the direction of FDI flows, in terms of absolute magnitude, in the case of 
Japan.  In this section we therefore examine that country’s foreign direct investment 
flows in more detail.  We first disaggregate Japanese FDI by individual Asian recipient 
country.  That is, limiting the sample of FDI recipients to Asian countries (as in Table 5), 
we not only allow the coefficient on China’s fitted FDI inflows to differ between Japan 
and other source countries, but we allow the Japanese outflow effect to be different for 
each Asian recipient of Japanese FDI.   
The results are shown in Table 6. The largest positive coefficients are for 
Japanese FDI in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.  The first 
country is an important supplier of raw materials to China, while the others are plausible 
members of common supply chains with China. The smallest coefficients are for 
Bangladesh, India and – interestingly – Korea.  The first two cases are consistent with the 
interpretation here insofar as Bangladesh and India are not linked into the same supply 
chains as China. The coefficient for Korea’s FDI receipts from Japan may be picking up   21 
the redirection of Japanese FDI toward lower-labor-cost markets, consistent with 
warnings of the hollowing out of Korean industry.
35  Note that this is consistent with 
what we found for Korea in Table 4 above. 
Another way of gaining insight into the redirection of Japanese FDI outflows is to 
disaggregate them by sector as well as region.  Table 7 disaggregates Japanese foreign 
investment over the period 1989-2003 into eight manufacturing industries and nine 
nonmanufacturing sectors.  For each region, we report the simple correlation between 
Japan’s sector-specific FDI in China and its sector-specific FDI in other countries.
36 
The results are consistent with those obtained from our gravity-model analysis.  
There is a positive correlation between Japanese FDI flows to China and Japanese FDI 
flows to other Asia whether we consider manufacturing, nonmanufacturing, or total FDI.  
This is the same complementarity that we observed using the gravity model above.  
Looking at individual sectors, the only exceptions are food processing, chemicals, 
construction, trade, and finance and insurance.  
For Latin America, we obtain the same weak negative correlation as in the 
gravity-model analysis.  Again, this is evident for manufacturing, nonmanufacturing and 
total FDI alike.  In Central and Eastern Europe, where we obtained a positive coefficient 
in the gravity-model analysis, we again see positive correlations for manufacturing, 
nonmanufacturing, and total Japanese FDI.  The positive correlation for manufacturing 
seems heavily driven by electrical machinery/electronics and motor vehicles/transport 
                                                 
35 Thus, from our results it would appear that the hollowing-out phenomenon in Korea reflects not so much 
the diversion of Korea’s own investment toward China as the diversion of inward investment toward lower-
labor-cost economies. 
36 Since we have only 15 time series observations for each region, a more sophisticated econometric 
analysis does not seem justified.  All values are expressed in real U.S. dollars (yen values are first 
converted by the yen/dollar exchange rate and then deflated by the U.S. price index).   22 
equipment.  We suspect that this correlation is spurious, as argued above.
37  The positive 
correlation for non-manufacturing investment is primarily driven by minerals and mining 
and by real estate.  (In the case of mining it is important to observe that our data for 
Eastern Europe include Russia as an inflow country.)  Again, we suspect that this is 
correlation, not causation, as argued above. 
The last column of Table 7 considers the correlation between Japanese FDI in 
China and Japanese FDI in OECD countries.
38  Our surprising result above was the 
finding of significant diversion of Japanese FDI away from OECD destinations as 
Japanese FDI in China expanded.  The same correlation is evident here in the sectoral 
results.  There is a negative correlation between Japanese FDI in China and Japanese FDI 
in the OECD for manufacturing, nonmanufacturing, and the total alike, although it is 
small in the case of nonmanufacturing sectors.  The correlation is negative for six of the 
eight manufacturing industries; the exceptions are textiles (where the effect is essentially 
zero) and chemicals.  The effects are more heterogeneous in the case of 
nonmanufacturing sectors – not surprisingly given the existence of only a very small 
negative correlation for nonmanufacturing industries overall. 
Overall, our aggregate results receive further support from this disaggregated 
analysis.  Japanese FDI in China and Japanese FDI in other Asian countries appear to be 
complements rather than substitutes, although the same happy outcome may not obtain in 
each and every industry; for example, producers of processed foods and chemicals are not 
likely to be so favored.  To the extent that China’s emergence results in FDI diversion, it 
                                                 
37 The correlation reflects the fact that Japanese firms were separately increasing their capacity in these 
manufacturing industries in both China and Eastern Europe in the late 1990s and the early part of the 
present decade, not that Eastern Europe and China were part of an integrated supply chain. 
38 Bear in mind that, as above, Mexico and South Korea are excluded from the OECD for purposes of this 
analysis.   23 
appears to mainly be the OECD countries that suffer.  We interpret in terms of the 
domestic-market effect.  Japanese firms that would have invested in the OECD in order 
to be able to produce close to and sell into its large market are increasingly attracted to 
China for essentially the same reasons.  Limits on their ability to finance and control 
operations in geographically diverse markets have thus led to some crowding out of 
Japanese FDI in the OECD in favor of Japanese FDI in China. 
 
8.  Conclusions 
There has been considerable recent discussion of the possibility that China’s 
emergence as a destination for investment has diverted FDI receipts from other countries, 
Asian countries in particular.  In this paper we analyzed this possibility using both 
aggregated and disaggregated data.  The aggregate analysis employing bilateral FDI 
flows from OECD sources to OECD and non-OECD destinations does not indicate FDI 
diversion from other Asian countries.  If anything, there is some evidence that 
developments making China a more attractive destination for FDI also make other Asian 
countries more attractive destinations for FDI, as would be the case if China and these 
other economies are part of the same global production networks.  Japanese firms, it 
appears from our results, are among the leaders in attempting to exploit these 
complementarities.  
On the other hand there is some evidence of FDI diversion from OECD recipients.  
We interpret this in terms of FDI motivated by the desire to produce close to the market 
where the final sale takes place.  For whatever reason – limits on their ability to raise 
finance for investment in multiple markets or limits on their ability to control operations   24 
in diverse locations – firms more inclined to invest in China for this reason are 
corresponding less inclined to invest in the OECD.  Again, it appears that Japanese firms 
are among the leaders in redirecting their foreign investment in this way. 
These findings then led us to examine Japanese FDI in China and other regions at 
the sectoral level. The sectoral patterns confirm the aggregate analysis.  Japanese FDI 
flows to China and other Asian countries tend to be positively, not negatively, correlated.  
The main exceptions in the case of manufacturing are food processing and chemicals, 
where supply-chain linkages are plausibly less prominent than in, say, consumer 
electronics.     
From the perspective of FDI diversion, then, China’s rise is both good and bad 
news.  It is good news for Asia, although it may not be such good news for individuals 
who depend for their livelihoods on the food-processing and chemicals industries, which 
are receiving less foreign investment as a result of Chinese competition.  On the other 
hand, China’s rise may be bad news in this respect for OECD countries and their 
manufacturing sectors in particular.   
As we found in our previous paper on trade, blanket statements concerning 
China’s impact are not particularly supportable.  The country’s emergence is a mixed 
blessing requiring a nuanced analysis.   25 
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Table 1.  First Stage Estimates: Determinants of China’s FDI Inflow 
 
  Coef  St Err  Coef 
 
St Err   Coef 
 
St Err  Coef 
 
St Err 
China's distance to source country  -2.43  0.05  -2.46  0.05  -2.46  0.05  -2.51  0.05 
China's GDP (log)      1.27  0.07  1.15  0.07     
China's political risk          0.063  0.004     
GDP of outflow country (log)  1.59  0.02  1.59  0.02  1.60  0.02  1.66  0.02 
GDP per capita of outflow country (log)  1.60  0.05  1.82  0.05  1.73  0.05  1.42  0.05 
GDP of inflow country (log)  0.10  0.02  0.06  0.02  0.05  0.02  0.03  0.02 
GDP per capita of inflow country (log)  -0.25  0.03  -0.12  0.03  -0.08  0.03  0.00  0.03 
Product of land areas (log)  -0.09  0.01  -0.07  0.01  -0.06  0.01  -0.04  0.01 
Distance (log)  0.10  0.03  0.08  0.03  0.07  0.03  0.04  0.02 
Common language dummy  0.67  0.07  0.72  0.07  0.70  0.06  0.67  0.06 
Number of land locked (0/1/2)  -0.23  0.05  -0.28  0.05  -0.27  0.05  -0.22  0.05 
Number of islands (0/1/2)  -1.27  0.05  -1.28  0.05  -1.23  0.05  -1.12  0.05 
Land border dummy  -0.14  0.10  -0.16  0.10  -0.17  0.10  -0.19  0.09 
Common colonizer post 1945  0.98  1.04  0.90  1.02  1.01  1.01  1.30  0.91 
Pairs ever in colonial relation  0.10  0.11  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.10  0.10 
Strict currency union  0.63  0.64  0.43  0.62  0.29  0.62  -0.23  0.56 
Political risk for outflow country  0.035  0.004  0.011  0.004  0.015  0.004  0.049  0.004 
Political risk for inflow country  0.036  0.003  0.020  0.003  0.016  0.003  0.006  0.003 
Year 1988                   
Year 1989              1.50  0.18 
Year 1990              1.12  0.18 
Year 1991              2.13  0.17 
Year 1992              2.36  0.16 
Year 1993              2.17  0.16 
Year 1994              3.57  0.16 
Year 1995              4.02  0.16 
Year 1996              4.61  0.16 
Year 1997              3.72  0.16 
Year 1998              3.25  0.17 
Year 1999              2.97  0.17 
Year 2000              2.84  0.16 
Year 2001              2.73  0.16 
Year 2002              2.92  0.16 
Constant  -40.4  0.8  -74.4  2.0  -74.7  2.0  -42.8  0.7 
R-squared  0.73    0.75     0.75    0.80    
Number of observations  7642               
Source: see text. 
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Table 2. Second Stage Estimates of China’s FDI Receipts on Other Countries’ 
FDI Inflows 
  IV  IV  OLS  OLS 
 
  Coef  St Err  Coef  St Err 
China's FDI inflow (log)  -0.01  0.04  0.25  0.02 
GDP of outflow country (log)  1.43  0.08  0.98  0.04 
GDP per capita of outflow country (log)  1.58  0.11  1.25  0.09 
GDP of inflow country (log)  1.11  0.04  1.05  0.03 
GDP per capita of inflow country (log)  -0.23  0.05  -0.17  0.05 
Product of land areas (log)  -0.07  0.02  -0.01  0.02 
Distance (log)  -0.96  0.05  -0.98  0.04 
Common language dummy  1.13  0.12  0.94  0.11 
Number of land locked (0/1/2)  -0.41  0.09  -0.34  0.08 
Number of islands (0/1/2)  -0.59  0.08  -0.48  0.08 
Land border dummy  0.34  0.14  0.39  0.17 
Common colonizer post 1945  7.02  0.67  6.68  1.67 
Pairs ever in colonial relation  1.86  0.17  1.97  0.17 
Strict currency union  4.29  0.34  4.50  1.02 
Political Risk for outflow country  0.08  0.01  0.07  0.01 
Political Risk for inflow country  0.05  0.00  0.04  0.00 
Constant  -80.1  2.86  -64.1  1.6 
Number of observations  7642    7642   
R-squared  0.55    0.56   
Note: Time fixed effects are included though not reported. 
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Table 3.   Effect of China’s FDI Receipts on Other Countries’ FDI Inflows, 
 by region 
 
  Asia   Asia    Latin 











OECD     OECD   
  Coef.  St Err.  Coef.  St Err.  Coef.  St Err.  Coef.  St Err. 
China's FDI inflow  0.74  0.10  -0.10  0.17  0.21  0.10  -0.13  0.06 
GDP of outflow country  0.33  0.17  1.96  0.35  1.06  0.22  1.31  0.11 
GDP per capita of outflow country  0.74  0.25  1.68  0.35  0.64  0.26  2.23  0.16 
GDP of inflow country  0.07  0.08  1.02  0.15  1.67  0.18  1.34  0.04 
GDP per capita of inflow country  0.10  0.11  2.40  0.46  -1.08  0.24  -0.77  0.16 
Product of land areas  0.14  0.05  -0.48  0.12  0.02  0.12  0.15  0.04 
Distance  -0.33  0.19  -2.99  0.75  -1.35  0.16  -1.41  0.09 
Common language dummy  0.28  0.22  -3.13  1.80      1.51  0.17 
Number of land locked (0/1/2)  0.02  0.26  -1.79  0.38  1.19  0.17  -0.79  0.13 
Number of islands (0/1/2)  0.35  0.14  -1.44  0.47  -1.52  0.42  -0.29  0.13 
Land border dummy      -2.74  1.02  0.97  0.29  -1.02  0.18 
Common colonizer post 1945          2.29  0.73     
Pairs ever in colonial relation  2.14  0.22  6.87  1.77  2.12  0.75  0.96  0.25 
Strict currency union      0.17  0.69         
Political risk for outflow country  0.07  0.02  0.06  0.02  0.08  0.02  0.07  0.01 
Political risk for inflow country  0.06  0.01  -0.02  0.02  0.10  0.02  0.08  0.01 
Constant  -27.8  5.12  -79.0  16.1  -75.9  8.13  -87.8  4.21 
Number of observations  1454    941    1025    3353   
R-squared  0.63    0.61    0.57    0.62   
Note: Time fixed effects are included though not reported.  OECD columns do not include Japan, Mexico, and South Korea 
as inflow countries.  (Japan and South Korea are instead included with Asia, Mexico with Latin America).  
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Table 4. Effect of China’s FDI Receipts on Individual Asian Countries 
 (Second Stage) 
 
  Coef.  Std. Err.  t-stat 
GDP of capital-outflow country (log)  0.65  0.24  2.8 
GDP per capita of capital-outflow country (log)  1.09  0.25  4.4 
GDP of capital-inflow country (log)  0.13  0.11  1.1 
GDP per capita of capital-flow country (log)  0.07  0.15  0.5 
Product of land areas (log)  0.08  0.06  1.4 
Distance (log)  -0.92  0.29  -3.2 
Common language dummy  0.64  0.24  2.7 
Number of land locked (0/1/2)  -0.001  0.24  0.0 
Number of islands (0/1/2)  0.01  0.19  0.0 
Dummy for pairs ever in colonial relation  2.09  0.35  5.9 
Political Risk for capital-outflow country   0.07  0.02  3.8 
Political Risk for capital-inflow country  0.05  0.01  3.7 
ChinaFDIfitted*Japan  0.70  0.16  4.3 
ChinaFDIfitted*Bangladesh  0.39  0.16  2.5 
ChinaFDIfitted*India  0.49  0.14  3.4 
ChinaFDIfitted*Indonesia  0.70  0.13  5.3 
ChinaFDIfitted*Korea  0.35  0.16  2.2 
ChinaFDIfitted*Malaysia  0.53  0.13  4.0 
ChinaFDIfitted*Pakistan  0.36  0.15  2.5 
ChinaFDIfitted*Philippine  0.52  0.15  3.6 
ChinaFDIfitted*Singapore  0.65  0.15  4.4 
ChinaFDIfitted*Thailand  0.58  0.14  4.2 
ChinaFDIfitted*Vietnam  0.65  0.16  4.0 
Constant  -36.3  6.24  -5.8 
Number of Observations  1454     
R-squared  0.60     
Note: Time fixed effects are included though not reported.  
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Table 5. The Effect of China’s FDI Receipts on Asian Countries’ FDI Inflows, 
by  Source Country 
  Coef.  St. Err.  t-stat 
GDP of capital-outflow country (log)  -0.90  0.37  -2.45 
GDP per capita of capital-outflow country (log)  1.18  0.51  2.32 
GDP of capital-inflow country (log)  -0.27  0.10  -2.81 
GDP per capita of capital-flow country (log)  0.15  0.11  1.36 
Product of land areas (log)  0.33  0.06  5.42 
Distance (log)  -0.18  0.23  -0.8 
Common language dummy  -1.26  0.29  -4.36 
Number of land locked (0/1/2)  -1.77  0.67  -2.65 
Number of islands (0/1/2)  1.77  0.22  8.18 
Dummy for pairs ever in colonial relation  0.09  0.35  0.27 
Political Risk for capital-outflow country  -0.04  0.02  -2.13 
Political Risk for capital-inflow country  0.06  0.01  6.18 
ChinaFDIfitted*Hungary  0.47  0.34  1.38 
ChinaFDIfitted*Spain  0.52  0.31  1.69 
ChinaFDIfitted*Czech  0.59  0.38  1.57 
ChinaFDIfitted*Slovak  0.69  0.31  2.24 
ChinaFDIfitted*New Zealand  0.81  0.27  3.01 
ChinaFDIfitted*Denmark  0.86  0.28  3.09 
ChinaFDIfitted*Poland  0.89  0.49  1.83 
ChinaFDIfitted*Japan  0.92  0.17  5.34 
ChinaFDIfitted*Mexico  1.33  0.40  3.29 
ChinaFDIfitted*Italy  1.33  0.24  5.56 
ChinaFDIfitted*Germany  1.43  0.22  6.56 
ChinaFDIfitted*Turkey  1.51  0.42  3.58 
ChinaFDIfitted*Korea  1.57  0.15  10.63 
ChinaFDIfitted*France  1.65  0.23  7.09 
ChinaFDIfitted*UK  1.67  0.25  6.79 
ChinaFDIfitted*Austria  1.69  0.40  4.18 
ChinaFDIfitted*Iceland  1.85  0.28  6.69 
ChinaFDIfitted*Australia  1.96  0.34  5.83 
ChinaFDIfitted*Finland  2.00  0.30  6.66 
ChinaFDIfitted*Sweden  2.02  0.34  5.89 
ChinaFDIfitted*Norway  2.14  0.70  3.07 
ChinaFDIfitted*US  2.23  0.24  9.35 
ChinaFDIfitted*Netherlands  2.44  0.24  10.07 
ChinaFDIfitted*Swiss  2.86  0.33  8.79 
ChinaFDIfitted*Portugal  3.10  0.59  5.27 
ChinaFDIfitted*Greece  5.07  1.23  4.12 
Constant  5.34  11.25  0.47 
Number of observations  1454     
R-squared  0.71     
Note: Time fixed effects are included though not reported.   33 
 
Table 6. The Effect of China’s FDI Receipts on Asian Countries’ FDI 
Inflows, by Source and Recipient Country 
 
  Coef.  Std. Err.  t-stat 
GDP of capital-outflow country (log)  -0.30  0.23  -1.3 
GDP per capita of capital-outflow country (log)  0.47  0.25  1.9 
GDP of capital-inflow country (log)  -0.11  0.09  -1.2 
GDP per capita of capital-flow country (log)  0.03  0.12  0.2 
Product of land areas (log)  0.22  0.05  4.3 
Distance (log)  -0.58  0.30  -2.0 
Common language dummy  -0.94  0.23  -4.0 
Number of land locked (0/1/2)  0.35  0.23  1.5 
Number of islands (0/1/2)  1.57  0.20  7.8 
Dummy for pairs ever in colonial relation  1.90  0.33  5.7 
Political Risk for capital-outflow country  0.05  0.02  2.8 
Political Risk for capital-inflow country  0.06  0.01  5.1 
ChinaFDIfitted*(Source country is not Japan)  1.35  0.14  9.7 
ChinaFDIfitted*Japan*Bangladesh  0.51  0.17  3.0 
ChinaFDIfitted*Japan*India  0.66  0.14  4.7 
ChinaFDIfitted*Japan*Indonesia  0.95  0.14  6.6 
ChinaFDIfitted*Japan*Korea  0.61  0.18  3.4 
ChinaFDIfitted*Japan*Malaysia  0.76  0.15  5.2 
ChinaFDIfitted*Japan*Pakistan  0.55  0.14  3.9 
ChinaFDIfitted*Japan*Philippine  0.65  0.16  4.0 
ChinaFDIfitted*Japan*Singapore  0.75  0.15  5.0 
ChinaFDIfitted*Japan*Thailand  0.87  0.15  5.9 
ChinaFDIfitted*Japan*Vietnam  0.85  0.20  4.4 
Constant  -6.56  6.00  -1.1 
Number of observations  1454     
R-squared  0.64     
Note: Time fixed effects are included though not reported. 
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Table 7.  Correlation between Japan’s FDI Outflow to China and 
Other Regions: by Sector 






Manufacturing Total  0.32  -0.05  0.10  -0.23 
   Food  -0.40  0.00  -0.28  -0.20 
   Textile  0.30  0.37  -0.03  0.08 
   Lumber & Pulp  0.14  0.12  -0.18  -0.04 
   Chemical  -0.29  -0.25  -0.06  0.42 
   Metal  0.42  0.40  0.23  -0.31 
   Machinery  0.16  -0.11  0.11  -0.15 
   Electrical  0.51  -0.11  0.49  -0.32 
   Transport  0.30  -0.08  0.51  -0.22 
          
Non-Manufacturing Total  0.20  -0.34  0.32  -0.02 
   Farming & Forestry   0.56  0.16  -0.14  0.23 
   Fishery  0.36  0.06  0.46  -0.08 
   Mining  0.18  -0.13  0.91  0.57 
   Construction  -0.15  0.39  -0.12  -0.22 
   Trade  -0.47  0.00  0.39  -0.05 
   Finance & Insurance  -0.27  0.20  -0.07  -0.01 
   Service  0.50  0.49  0.22  0.58 
   Transportation  0.63  0.32  0.36  -0.24 
   Real Estate  0.20  0.51  0.86  0.04 
          
Total  0.18  -0.22  0.07  -0.33 
Note: The sample period is 1989 to 2003. FDI is expressed in real US dollar term. 
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Appendix 1. Data Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variables  Mean   St. Dev.   Sources 
FDI inflow (log of millions of dollars)  3.57  2.72  SourceOECD 
GDP (log)  26.31  1.55  World Development Indicators 
GDP per capita (log)  9.67  0.83  World Development Indicators 
Product of land areas (log)  25.28  2.54  Andrew Rose' s Website 
Distance (log)  7.92  1.00  Andrew Rose' s Website 
Common language dummy  0.10  0.30  Andrew Rose' s Website 
Number of land locked (0/1/2)  0.26  0.47  Andrew Rose' s Website 
Number of islands (0/1/2)  0.25  0.46  Andrew Rose' s Website 
Land border dummy  0.05  0.21  Andrew Rose' s Website 
Common colonizer post 1945 dummy  0.003  0.05  Andrew Rose' s Website 
Pairs ever in colonial relation dummy  0.03  0.16  Andrew Rose' s Website 
Strict currency union dummy  0.001  0.03  Andrew Rose' s Website 
Political risk for outflow country  80.0  9.1  PRS Group 
Political risk for inflow country  70.8  13.6  PRS Group 
 